Despite the textual and evidentiary support for the Arizona Supreme Court's reading of Belton, our opinion has been widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search. [...] Accordingly, we reject this reading of Belton and hold that the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search. (Arizona v. Gant 2009, Stevens writing for the majority)

As Justice O'Connor observed, "lower court decisions seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel." Thornton, 541 U. S., at 624 (Opinion concurring in part)

SCALIA has similarly noted that, although it is improbable that an arrestee could gain access to weapons stored in his vehicle after he has been handcuffed and secured in the backseat of a patrol car, cases allowing a search in "this precise factual scenario . . . are legion." [...] Indeed, some courts have upheld searches under Belton "even when . . . the handcuffed arrestee has already left the scene." 541 U. S., at 628 (same). (Arizona v. Gant 2009, Stevens writing for the majority)

Although it does not follow from Chimel, circumstances unique to the automobile context alsojustify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is "reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in thevehicle." Thornton v. United States, 541 U. S. 615, 632 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). [...]

Consistent with the holding in Thornton v. United States, 541 U. S. 615 (2004), and following the suggestion in JUSTICE SCALIA's opinion concurring in the judgment in that case, id., at 632, we also conclude that circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.

[...]or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. (Arizona v. Gant 2009, Stevens writing for the majority)

In my view we should simply abandon the Belton-Thornton charade of officer safety and overrule those cases. I would hold that a vehicle search incident to arrest is ipso facto "reasonable" only when the object of the search is evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made, or of another crime that the officer has probable cause to believe occurred. (Arizona v. Gant 2009, Scalia writing in concurrence)

Law enforcement officers face a risk of being shot whenever they pull a car over. But that risk is at its height at the time of the initial confrontation; and it is not at all reduced by allowing a search of the stopped vehicle after the driver has been arrested and placed in the squad car. I observed in Thornton that the government had failed to provide a single instance in which a formerly restrained arrestee escaped to retrieve a weapon from his own vehicle, 541 U. S., at 626; Arizona and its amici have not remedied that significant deficiency in the present case. (Arizona v. Gant 2009, Scalia writing in concurrence)

JUSTICE ALITO insists that the Court must demand a good reason for abandoning prior precedent. That is true enough, but it seems to me ample reason that the precedent was badly reasoned and produces erroneous (in this case unconstitutional) results. (Arizona v. Gant 2009, Scalia writing in concurrence)

If there was reliance in Dickerson, there certainly is substantial reliance here. The Belton rule has been taught to police officers for more than a quarter century. Many searches--almost certainly including more than a few that figure in cases now on appeal--were conducted in scrupulous reliance on that precedent. It is likely that, on the very day when this opinion is announced, numerous vehicle searches will be conducted in good faith by police officers who were taught the Belton rule. (Arizona v. Gant 2009, Alito writing in dissent)

The second part of the Court's new rule, which the Court takes uncritically from JUSTICE SCALIA's separate opinion in Thornton, raises doctrinal and practical prob-lems that the Court makes no effort to address. Why, for example, is the standard for this type of evidence-gathering search "reason to believe" rather than probable cause? And why is this type of search restricted to evidence of the offense of arrest? It is true that an arrestee's vehicle is probably more likely to contain evidence of the crime of arrest than of some other crime, but if reason-to-believe is the governing standard for an evidence-gathering search incident to arrest, it is not easy to see why an officer should not be able to search when the officer has reason to believe that the vehicle in questionp ossesses evidence of a crime other than the crime of arrest. (Arizona v. Gant 2009, Alito writing in dissent)

I do not understand the Court's decision to reach the following situations. First, it is not uncommon for an officer to arrest some but not all of the occupants of a vehicle. The Court's decision in this case does not address the question whether in such a situation a search of the passenger compartment may be justified on the ground that the occupants who are not arrested could gain access to the car and retrieve a weapon or destroy evidence. Second, there may be situations in which an arresting officer has cause to fear that persons who were not passengers in the car might attempt to retrieve a weapon or evidence from the car while the officer is still on the scene. The decision in this case, as I understand it, does not address that situation either. (Arizona v. Gant 2009, Alito writing in dissent)